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Food Federalism: States, Local Governments, and
the Fight for Food Sovereignty
SARAH SCHINDLER
Recently, a number of states have sought to withdraw or restrain local
power. In this Article, which is part of the “Re-Thinking State
Relevance” symposium hosted by the Ohio State Law Journal, I write
about a state taking the opposite approach, and attempting to
affirmatively endow its local governments with additional powers. The
state is Maine, and the context is control over local food production and
sales. This Article begins by addressing the emergence of the
sustainable local foods movement broadly, and reasons for the growth
of this movement. It then focuses more pointedly on the food sovereignty
movement, considering the ways that this movement has sought to put
control into the hands of local people, and thus local governments. This
Article then considers the power struggles between state and local
governments, and the reason that even strong local governments might
not be able to act as forcefully as they would like in areas such as food
regulation. Finally, this Article addresses Maine’s passage of a state
law recognizing local food sovereignty, and the federalism concerns
that this law raised. This Article seeks to present a roadmap for states
that wish to play a more active role in advancing local food goals, or
empowering local governments more broadly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When I ask my first-year students what they know about environmental
regulation, they often mention the famous federal environmental statutes—the
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. While
these classic federal statutes make up the bulk of a traditional environmental law
curriculum, many scholars have expanded their conception of environmental
law.1 This expanded view includes actions taken at the state and local levels, as
well as topics outside the traditional canon.2
The topic of this symposium is “Re-Thinking State Relevance.” While a
number of scholars focus their work on the interplay between state and federal
governments when it comes to environmental law, my research focuses
primarily on local governments and the ways they can aid in advancing
environmentalist agendas and fighting climate change.3
Local governments have been working toward environmental goals on a
number of fronts, especially through climate change mitigation and adaptation.4
But in this Article, I want to address a topic that would likely be considered
outside the traditional canon, but one that constitutes a growing and important
part of environmental law: local and regional food systems.5 More specifically,
1 See generally Jason J. Czarnezki & Sarah Schindler, President Trump, the New
Chicago School, & the Future of Environmental Law and Scholarship, in PERSPECTIVES ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP: ESSAYS ON PURPOSE, SHAPE AND DIRECTION (Ole
Windahl Pederson ed., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 196) (on file with author)
(describing the expanding nature of what scholars consider to fall within the category of
“environmental law”).
2 Id.
3 See generally Sarah Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores: Legal
Solutions to the Legacies of Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471 (2012)
(discussing how local governments have an economic incentive to repurpose big box stores
and proposing four alternative uses: retail reuse, adaptive reuse, demolition and
redevelopment, and demolition and regreening); Sarah Schindler, Unpermitted Urban
Agriculture: Transgressive Actions, Changing Norms, and the Local Food Movement, 2014
WIS. L. REV. 369 (2014) [hereinafter Schindler, Unpermitted] (discussing illegal local food
actions as a catalyst for change); Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED: Municipal
Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285 (2010) (discussing
private rule creation).
4 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Zoning, Transportation, and Climate Change, 8 ZONING L.
& PRAC. REP. 1, 2 (2007); Emma L. Tompkins & Hallie Eakin, Managing Private and Public
Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 3, 4 (2012); Katrina Fischer
Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that Harm the
Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1132–33 (2012).
5 A number of environmental law scholars have been writing about food systems and
food law in recent years, to the extent that a co-author and I have suggested that it is now
part of an expanded definition of environmental law. See Czarnezki & Schindler, supra note
1 (manuscript at 196–97); see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Regional Foodsheds:
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a number of local governments have been adopting what are known as “food
sovereignty” ordinances with a variety of goals, including improving their
ability to produce and consume locally grown food.6
This Article will begin in Part II by addressing the emergence of the
sustainable local foods movement and reasons for its growth. That Part will
specifically address how local food systems can advance environmental goals.
Part III will turn to a focused discussion of the food sovereignty movement. It
considers the way this movement seeks to put control in the hands of local
people, and thus local governments, while Part IV addresses the motivations
behind the adoption of local food sovereignty ordinances. Part V turns to the
power struggles between state and local governments, and the reason that even
strong local governments might not be able to act as forcefully as they would
like in areas such as food regulation. In discussing the relationship between state
and local governments, and the fact that local governments often lack power to
take bold actions to advance environmental goals, this Part will suggest that this
leaves a lot of room for states to step in and take actions to encourage and
empower local governments. Part VI presents an example of a state doing just
that: it addresses Maine’s passage of a State law recognizing local food
sovereignty and the federalism issues that this law raised. This Article concludes
by addressing the way that states can play a more active role in advancing local
food goals.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL FOODS AND
ENVIRONMENTALISM
This Article is part of the symposium panel dealing with environmental law.
Thus, it begins by addressing the ways in which local foods are related to
environmental law, environmentalism, and environmental goals.
The local foods movement has gained much traction and public visibility in
recent years.7 There are a number of reasons for the rise in interest in local foods,
including “deeply held philosophical concerns about corporate influence over
Are Our Local Zoning and Land Use Regulations Healthy?, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
599, 600 (2011).
6 See Alexis Baden-Mayer & Katherine Paul, Can Food Sovereignty Laws Protect
Local Farms from Annihilation?, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N (Sept. 11, 2013),
https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/can-food-sovereignty-laws-protect-local-farmsannihilation [https://perma.cc/T6U8-2RX2]; see also Town of Montville, Me., Montville
Local Food Security Resolution (2011), available at https://www.sourcewatch.org/images
/3/33/Montville_Local_Food_Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW28-JTAJ] (last visited
Apr. 24, 2018); Letter from Neil Coonerty & Ellen Pirie to Bd. of Supervisors, Cty. of Santa
Cruz (Sept. 6, 2011), https://foodfreedom.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/santa-cruz-right-togrow-resolutn.pdf [https://perma.cc/R35Q-E2ZQ].
7 See Oran B. Hesterman & Daniel Horan, The Demand for ‘Local’ Food Is Growing—
Here’s Why Investors Should Pay Attention, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 25, 2007),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-demand-for-local-food-is-growing-2017-4
[https://perma.cc/R2GQ-KMFV].
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the U.S. food supply and the environmental ramifications of our current
centralized food system structure, to a simple preference for food varieties that
have been bred for flavor rather than tolerance for long-distance shipping.”8
Indeed, much of the discussion surrounding the increased interest in local foods
connects the idea to more sustainable agricultural practices, and a desire to move
away from industrial agricultural production and the harms associated with it.9
As I have written about previously, those harms fall into two broad categories:
harm to the public health and harm to the environment.10

A. Public Health Concerns Associated with Industrial Agriculture
Industrial agricultural practices are tied to a number of public health
concerns, including food insecurity, food deserts, and diet-related disease, all of
which could also be thought of as environmental justice issues.11 First, food
insecurity is the idea that many people do not have access to sufficient amounts
of affordable, healthy foods to feed their families.12 Scholars have argued that
food insecurity is tied to large-scale industrial food production due to factors
such as reliance on oil products and the need for food to be imported from farflung production locations.13
8 Debra Tropp & Malini Ram Moraghan, Local Food Demand in the U.S.: Evolution

of the Marketplace and Future Potential, in HARVESTING OPPORTUNITY: THE POWER OF
REGIONAL FOOD SYSTEM INVESTMENTS TO TRANSFORM COMMUNITIES 15, 27 (Andrew
Dumont et al. eds., 2017).
9 Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that there is a large
monoculture-based industrial agriculture scale farm down the street from your house!
However, most of the literature discussing local foods defines it as “alternative and
oppositional” to industrial food systems. See Robert Feagan, The Place of Food: Mapping
Out the ‘Local’ in Local Food Systems, 31 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 23, 24 (2007)
(comparing “local food systems” movements, including alternative agro-food networks,
community food security, civic agriculture, post-productivism, shortened food chains, and
the “quality turn”).
10 Sarah B. Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens and Front Yard Gardens: The Conflict
Between Local Governments and Locavores, 87 TUL. L. REV. 231, 262–68 (2012)
[hereinafter Schindler, Backyard] (discussing public health harms including food insecurity,
food deserts, and obesity—and environmental harms—including the oil-intensive nature of
industrial agriculture, monocropping, and animal welfare).
11 Id.
12 DARRIN NORDAHL, PUBLIC PRODUCE: THE NEW URBAN AGRICULTURE xiii (2009)
(“Until communities figure out how to provide for themselves, instead of relying on a
handful of petrophilic agribusinesses in remote locations in our country and abroad, our
satiety will be tenuous.”); see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TRADE
REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY: CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKAGES 29 (2003) (defining food
security as the state where “all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences
for an active and healthy life”).
13 Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 234; ANNIE SHATTUCK & ERIC HOLTGIMÉNEZ, WHY THE LUGAR-CASEY GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY ACT WILL FAIL TO CURB HUNGER
1, 3 (2009); AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND
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Industrial agriculture might also be related to food deserts: areas that lack
access to fresh, healthy foods and places that sell them.14 This is in part because
the zoning that is required for agricultural operations means that in many parts
of the country farms are not close to urban areas, so there is a lack of proximity
to produce.15 Wealthier areas often have markets and grocery stores that have
sufficient demand to ship in produce, but this is not necessarily the case in all
communities.16 Thus, if small-scale or urban farming were permitted closer to
or within communities that are currently food deserts, the problems of proximity
and distribution could be alleviated.17
Diet-related diseases, such as diabetes and heart disease, are another public
health concern that has been linked to the consumption of industrially-produced,
processed foods.18 In contrast to all of this, local foods can help to foster and
build social capital, a sense of community and identity, and provide avenues for
people to meet their neighbors, or to share food that they have grown
themselves.19 This type of “civic agriculture” can help improve public health
within a community.20

DEPRIVATION 7 (1981) (noting that hunger is not just related to insufficient amounts of food,
but the systems for food distribution as well). But see Jane Black, What’s in a Number? How
the Press Got the Idea that Food Travels 1,500 Miles from Farm to Plate, SLATE (Sept. 17,
2008), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2008/09/whats_in_a_number.html
[https://perma.cc/5QP4-ELAQ] (arguing that the famous “1,500 miles” statistic is flawed).
14 Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 266.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 267.
17 See JACOB E. GERSEN ET AL., Nutrition, in FOOD LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 639,
666, 690–91 (2015) (describing food deserts). But see Deborah N. Archer & Tamara C.
Belinfanti, We Built It and They Did Not Come: Using New Governance Theory in the Fight
for Food Justice in Low-Income Communities of Color, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 307, 311
(2016) (suggesting “incorrect assumptions about the barriers to accessing healthy foods”).
See generally SEN, supra note 13 (discussing the way that causes of hunger and malnutrition
are related to poverty and food distribution issues).
18 See generally JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE
LIMITS OF CAPITALISM (2011) (analyzing how capitalism contributes to obesity and arguing
that local, organic food can help solve the problem).
19 Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 281–82; Schindler, Unpermitted, supra note
3, at 371–72. But see Margot Pollans & Michael Roberts, Setting the Table for Urban
Agriculture, 46 URB. LAW. 199, 224 (2014) (discussing potential benefits of urban
agriculture and arguing that it is not inherently beneficial).
20 See, e.g., Margot J. Pollans, Farming and Eating, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 99, 100–01
(2017) (noting that one cost of the industrial food system is an obscuring of the shared
interests between food producers and food consumers); Laura Saldivar-Tanaka & Marianne
E. Krasny, Culturing Community Development, Neighborhood Open Space, and Civic
Agriculture: The Case of Latino Community Gardens in New York City, 21 AGRIC. & HUM.
VALUES 399 (2004) (discussing the role that community gardens play in community
development and civic agriculture).
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B. Environmental Health Concerns Associated with Industrial
Agriculture
Even more relevant for purposes of this Article is that there are a number of
harms to the environment that have been linked to industrial agricultural
systems.21 First, industrial agriculture is oil intensive, which contributes to
greenhouse gas emissions.22 Further, factory farms, where most animals that are
killed for food live,23 are associated with a host of environmental harms,
including runoff that pollutes our waterways, and of course, harm to the animals
themselves.24 Finally, industrial farming is reliant upon monocultures.25 It
typically focuses on large-scale production of a single crop, which results in
land that is over-cultivated and topsoil that is not protected.26
Some of these harms can be alleviated, at least incrementally, as people find
ways to opt out of the industrial food system. This could involve the
development of alternative distribution networks or alternative mechanisms of
production. But it could also involve a move toward local food production and
consumption, where people grow and raise their own food, or have access to
food that is grown within their communities.27
Indeed, one of the strongest arguments that ties local food to environmental
goals is that local food systems can help improve resiliency, which is an

21 See, e.g., Margot Pollans, Food Systems, in CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND
LAW (Justin Gundlach & Michael Burger eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 31)
(on file with author) (“Modern agricultural systems generate significant environmental
degradation.”).
22 Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural
Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 600 (2010)
(discussing animal waste with respect to Concentrated Animal Feed Operations (“CAFOs,”
also known as factory farms)).
23 CAFOs “produce ‘more than 99 percent of all farmed animals raised and slaughtered
in the United States.’” Elizabeth Ann Overcash, Unwarranted Discrepancies in the
Advancement of Animal Law: The Growing Disparity in Protection Between Companion
Animals and Agricultural Animals, 90 N.C. L. REV. 837, 861 (2012) (quoting Ending
Factory Farming, FARM FORWARD), http://www.farmforward.com/farming-forward/factory
-farming (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
24 Margot J. Pollans, Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural Exceptionalism, 77
OHIO ST. L.J. 1195, 1208 (2016); Angelo, supra note 22, at 607.
25 Industrial Agriculture: The Outdated, Unsustainable System that Dominates U.S.
Food Production, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/ourwork/food-agriculture/our-failing-food-system/industrial-agriculture#.W5aWCJNKgU0
[https://perma.cc/69EE-DGLA].
26 Angelo, supra note 22, at 606.
27 Schindler, Unpermitted, supra note 3, at 372 (noting that some of these harms might
be partially alleviated as more people have access to local food); see also Mia Shirley, Food
Ordinances: Encouraging Eating Local, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 511, 518
(2013) (“Increased reliance on local, sustainable food sources can help reduce the
environmental damage caused by the current U.S. food production system.”).
THE
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important topic in recent environmental literature.28 Resilience means the
“capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize” while still retaining
its same basic function.29 The idea is that if there are a number of local or
regional food systems in place, people will be less reliant on production from a
single geographic area, or of a single monoculture crop.30 Thus, in the event of
a large-scale climate-related catastrophe, natural disaster, or chemical attack, it
is likely that in some areas the availability and affordability of food would be
impacted.31 But, to the extent that many localities and regions have their own
substantial food production and distribution systems in place, it is likely that
food production in many other parts of the country would be unaffected. Thus,
producers could work on distributing from those areas with robust local systems
to the areas that were targeted by the disaster.
Given all of this, it is clear that there are a number of environmental benefits
to moving away from large scale industrialized food systems and toward more
localized ones. Because of this, and for other reasons as well, which will be
addressed below, a number of local governments have begun to take steps
toward strengthening their own local food systems.32 One way that localities
have attempted this is through the adoption of food sovereignty ordinances.33

III. FOOD SOVEREIGNTY
The term food sovereignty has international origins tied to a global peasant
farmers’ social movement.34 In this original context, it was defined as “the right
of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and [farmers’] right to define their
own food and agriculture systems.”35 The central idea is that food sovereignty
28 See, e.g., Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 276.
29 Brian Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social–

Ecological Systems, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 5, 6 (2004).
30 See id.
31 Pollans, supra note 21 (manuscript at 1) (suggesting that “[c]limate change may
increase food-related public health concerns by damaging food production, undermining
food quality, and impeding food access”).
32 See infra notes 34–36.
33 See Blue Hill, Me., Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of 2011
(Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://farmtoconsumer.org/news_wp/wp-content/uploads
/2013/05/BlueHill_LocalFoodOrd_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SAZ-FJAA].
34 See Madeleine Fairbairn, Framing Transformation: The Counter-Hegemonic
Potential of Food Sovereignty in the US Context, 29 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 217, 217 (2012)
(describing the origins of food sovereignty tied to La Vía Campesina). See generally Hilda
E. Kurtz, Framing Multiple Food Sovereignties: Comparing the Nyéléni Declaration and
the Local Food and Self-Governance Ordinance in Maine, in FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 163 (Amy Trauger ed., 2015) (discussing Maine’s “Ordinance
language with an eye to how particular clauses enact and/or adapt rights claims found in the
2007 Nyéléni Declaration of Food Sovereignty”).
35 Declaration of Nyéléni, NYELENI.ORG (Feb. 27, 2007), http://nyeleni.org/spip.php?
article290 [https://perma.cc/M38Z-EGHU].
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gives control over the way that food is produced, sold, and eaten within local
communities to those local communities.36 However, as the concept of food
sovereignty has made its way to the United States, the term has taken on a bit of
a libertarian bent, which I will further explain below; in this country, food
sovereignty seems to manifest as a desire to avoid regulations that currently
govern food production.37
In the U.S., food sovereignty ordinances have originated in local
communities.38 Maine, where I live, was one of the first states where a number
of local towns adopted these ordinances.39 The goal of the ordinances is to
declare towns as “food sovereign,” meaning that the town’s own rules should
govern with respect to food that is grown, raised, or produced, and sold for
consumption within that town.40
These new food sovereignty designations are related to, but distinct from,
other state and local attempts to limit the application of certain food safety laws
to small-scale producers. For example, a number of communities have enacted
“cottage food laws.”41 These laws tend to exempt home kitchens from certain
regulations, or to allow certain products made in a home kitchen and sold locally
and directly to consumers to be exempt from regulation.42 In contrast to these
cottage food laws, which focus on exemption of certain types of products, or
products made in certain ways, food sovereignty ordinances have a bolder and
more wide-ranging aim: they seek to declare their local right to regulate food,
and perhaps even a right to food itself.43
In order to understand what local food sovereignty ordinances are trying to
do, it is important to first have a basic understanding of the current regulatory
36 See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, The Law and Political Economy of Contemporary Food:
Some Reflections on the Local and the Small, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 131 (2015)
(“[A] core principle of food sovereignty . . . [is] that small producers and consumers should
make democratic decisions about food provisioning in particular social and geographical
spaces.”).
37 See, e.g., Stephen R. Miller, A Coordinated Approach to Food Safety and Land Use
Law at the Urban Fringe, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. ETHICS 422, 435 (2015).
38 See Julia Bayly, Food Sovereignty Continues to Pick up Steam Around the State,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 10, 2018), http://bangordailynews.com/2018/03/10/homestead
/food-sovereignty-continues-to-pick-up-steam-around-the-state/ [https://perma.cc/Q7NWAA5L].
39 Id.
40 Id. But see Kurtz, supra note 34, at 165–67 (noting that some scholars have
challenged the emphasis on localism in the U.S. food sovereignty movement).
41 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 37, at 431–32 (describing cottage food laws); see also
Dan Flynn, More Food Producers Exempt from FSMA Under Tester-Hagen, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/04/more-food-producersexempt-from-fsma-under-tester-hagen/#.WtX1yNPwbVo [https://perma.cc/S8CV-MEFY]
(discussing Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Tester-Hagan Amendment, which
exempts small scale producers engaged in marketing).
42 Miller, supra note 37, at 432 (noting that cottage food laws often exempt from
regulation foods that are “not potentially hazardous”).
43 See Blue Hill, supra note 33.
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scheme that governs agriculture, food production, and food safety in the U.S.
The key for purposes of this Article is that our current food system is heavily
controlled by federal agencies and regulations. The FDA controls most food
safety and labeling issues, though the USDA also has jurisdiction over meat and
poultry.44 Further, states adopt their own regulations pursuant to and in
compliance with those federal regulations. States must ensure that any state and
local requirements are at least as strict as the federal rules.45 A big reason for
this regulation is to protect the public health; food-borne illness is a real concern
and sickens many people every year (although, I would note, the numbers are
small in comparison to diet-related diseases).46
In recent years, a small number of towns (and states) have begun to adopt
statutes and ordinances addressing issues that could at least tangentially be tied
to food sovereignty, or that relate to issues of who has control over the
production and consumption of food.47 The goal of these towns is effectively to
declare themselves exempt from existing state and federal licensing and
inspection procedures.

IV. WHY FOOD SOVEREIGNTY?: MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE ORDINANCES
The motivations behind these U.S. food sovereignty ordinances are
multifaceted. First, the ordinances are partially about democratic selfgovernance and self-determination.48 Indeed, many of the ordinances adopted

44 Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2012); Poultry Products

Inspection Act (PPIA), 21 U.S.C. § 454 (2012).
45 Under an at least equal to cooperative agreement with the USDA Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS), States may operate their own Meat and Poultry Inspection
programs if they meet and enforce requirements “at least equal to” those imposed under the
Federal Meat Inspection Act, Poultry Products Inspection Act and Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act of 1978. Letter from Alfred V. Almanza, Acting Deputy Under Sec’y, Office
of Food Safety, Adm’r, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., to Walter E. Whitcomb, Comm’r,
Me. Dep’t of Agric., Conservation & Forestry (July 6, 2017), [hereinafter Letter from
Almanza] https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/inspection/state-inspectionprograms/state-inspection-and-cooperative-agreements [https://perma.cc/P37L-WH7Y]; see
also FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 661(b); PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 454(b).
46 See Emily Broad Leib & Margot J. Pollans, The New Food Safety, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author) (arguing that the U.S.
overregulates when it comes to food safety); see also BAYLEN LINNEKIN, BITING THE HAND
THAT FEEDS US 26 (2016) (arguing against new FDA regulations with small marginal
benefits).
47 See, e.g., Pollans, supra note 21 (manuscript at 21) (noting that food sovereignty is
concerned with “how and by whom food is produced”).
48 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 36, at 118 (“food sovereignty evokes populist and early
social-era agrarian arguments about economic self-governance as its own political good”).
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in Maine use language about “assert[ing] our right to self-government” and
recognizing “the authority to protect that right as belonging to the Town.”49
These ordinances are also often about food choice, which many view as
political, akin to a form of free speech or other fundamental right.50 Indeed, food
choice advocates have buoyed the idea of food sovereignty.51 For example, “in
challenging the FDA’s mandate that milk sold in interstate commerce be
pasteurized,” the Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund suggested “that milk
consumers have been deprived of fundamental privacy rights—including the
right to protect one’s own bodily health.”52
There is also a sense that many involved with this local fight for “food
sovereignty” would simply prefer that the government stay out of the way.53
This idea ties into debates founded in civil-libertarianism, and arguments
regarding local government overreach, the “nanny state,” and public health
paternalism.54 Some local food activists believe that people should be able to
engage in one-on-one exchanges with local farmers without governmental
oversight or involvement.55
This libertarian-style argument also relates to another purpose of these
ordinances, which is to further the ability of local residents to conduct business
without unduly burdensome interference. Often, these attempts at food
sovereignty are in response to feelings that people want to be able to cook and
sell small amounts of food locally without going through expensive and timeconsuming permitting and licensing processes.56 Indeed, the origin of the food
sovereignty discussion in Maine is often tied to small-scale chicken farmers in
49 See, e.g., Blue Hill, supra note 33; see also Appleton, Me., Town of Appleton Local

Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (June 13, 2012), available at
http://appleton.maine.gov/vertical/sites/%7B5CBE9B20-93F0-4ECA-B07C-188D88398A3
1%7D/uploads/Food_Ordinance_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYP8-9TU6] (relying on right
of self-governance).
50 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 737, 746 (2013).
51 See id.
52 Id. at 743.
53 At least one commentator has suggested that many local attempts at food sovereignty
are in fact more accurately described as “anti-regulat[ory].” See Allison Condra, Food
Sovereignty in the United States: Supporting Local and Regional Food Systems, 8 J. FOOD
L. & POL’Y 281, 296 (2012) [hereinafter Condra, Food Sovereignty] (“[M]ovements that may
look like food sovereignty at first glance . . . that increased protection for locally made
products and would have criminalized federal regulation of said local products, is less of a
food sovereignty statement and more of an anti-regulation statement.”). “Food sovereignty
envisions a role for government in ensuring food safety and in developing its own food and
agriculture system. In these local food ordinances, it is easy to assume, based on the language
of the ordinance, that the goal is de- or no regulation of the food system at the level of
producer direct to consumer transactions.” Id. at 308.
54 Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up
Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE, 16, 29 (2015).
55 See generally Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53 (discussing the local food
sovereignty movement).
56 See Schindler, supra note 54, at 30.
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the state who “were faced with costs of more than $20,000 to build on-site
slaughter facilities . . . or with hauling live chickens to one of just five USDA
certified facilities in [the] 35,000 square mile state.”57 The goal of some food
sovereignty advocates would be to allow backyard or on-farm slaughter and
direct-to-consumer sale thereafter.58
Food sovereignty is also concerned with food safety, though perhaps in a
way that is different from what our current food safety regulations focus upon.
As it was originally formulated, food sovereignty involved demands that would
“control pests and disease, protect against environmental pollution, prohibit the
use of antibiotics and hormones in aquacultures, and ban irradiation of food.”59
Thus, the focus is on some of the food safety-related concerns that are
specifically associated with larger scale, industrial agricultural productions, but
which are typically less problematic in the context of small-scale food
production.60
A final motivation for food sovereignty ordinances relates to the issue of
scale.61 Although many local farmers have small-scale operations, most of our
federal and state food-related regulations were designed to govern and check
abuses by large-scale food producers.62 Here, I believe that it is useful to
reference the “matching principle,” which suggests that the size of government
should not be larger than the size of the geographic area of the problem it is
trying to solve.63 Effectively, this means that we should match the level of
government to the scope of the problem. Thus, because a concern like climate
change is a global problem, we would ideally address it through international
governmental coordination. In contrast, one could argue, the types of food local
57 Kurtz, supra note 34, at 170.
58 See Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 303–04.
59 Alli Condra, Balancing the Scales: Food “Sovereignty” and Food Safety, FOOD

SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/12/balancing-thescales-food-sovereignty-and-food-safety/ [https://perma.cc/2TQT-K5GA].
60 See generally Leib & Pollans, supra note 46 (discussing inherent risks associated
with industrialization and the fact that U.S. approaches to food safety often ignore that risk);
Margot J. Pollans, Food Fascism (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Ohio State Law
Journal) (arguing that there is a dichotomy between food safety law, which seeks safety via
sterilization and homogenization, and food sovereignty laws, which seek safety via
transparency and control).
61 See Alli Condra, Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinances, AGRIC.
MGT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chi., Ill.), Aug. 2012, at 16, 17 (“[O]ne of the
ultimate goals of the [food sovereignty] movement is to create scale-appropriate regulations
of agriculture.”).
62 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (detailing the
existing regulatory system and related mismatches in scale, along with possible reforms);
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 130, 131 (2005) (analyzing jurisdictional mismatch in contemporary
environmental law).
63 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
23, 25 (1996).
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people can grow, sell, and eat within their community should be governed at the
local level.64 Michael Pollan expressed this argument in a popular New York
Times piece, stating:
Today the revival of local food economies is being hobbled by a tangle of
regulations originally designed to check abuses by the very largest food
producers. Farmers should be able to smoke a ham and sell it to their neighbors
without making a huge investment in federally approved facilities. Food-safety
regulations must be made sensitive to scale and marketplace, so that a small
producer selling direct off the farm or at a farmers’ market is not regulated as
onerously as a multinational food manufacturer. This is not because local food
won’t ever have food-safety problems—it will—only that its problems will be
less catastrophic and easier to manage because local food is inherently more
traceable and accountable.65

Thus, there are clearly a large number of reasons that towns might want to
adopt a food sovereignty ordinance, but legally, do they have a right to do so?
The rest of this Article will address that question.

V. THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Because this symposium addresses the role of states, the following Part
provides an example of a state’s involvement in promoting local food
sovereignty. However, in order to understand this dynamic, I will first briefly
lay out some of the debate and discussion surrounding the relationship and
interaction between state and local governments, as that relationship plays an
outsized role in the attempts at food sovereignty.66 Further, in order to

64 Of course, food safety concerns and the prevention of food-borne illness relate to

public health broadly, which is a national concern, not just a local one. See Federal Meat
Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2012); Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 21
U.S.C. § 454 (2012). But see MARY CHRISTINA WOOD ET AL., REFORM OF LOCAL LAND USE
LAWS TO ALLOW MICROLIVESTOCK ON URBAN HOMESTEADS 9 (Univ. of Or. Envtl. & Nat.
Res. Law Program Sustainable Land Use Project, 2010) (“[D]isease outbreaks in locally
produced food systems are more isolated and therefore more contained.”).
65 Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.ny
times.com/2008/10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc
/BD8M-STA9] (“Perhaps the single greatest impediment to the return of livestock to the land
and the revival of local, grass-based meat production is the disappearance of regional
slaughter facilities. The big meat processors have been buying up local abattoirs only to close
them down as they consolidate, and the U.S.D.A. does little to support the ones that
remain.”).
66 See Miller, supra note 37, at 434; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The
Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1230–52 (1999).
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understand the relationship between state and local governments, one must first
understand the power of local governments themselves.67
The Black letter rule with respect to local government power comes from a
case called Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, which is that, at base, local
governments are powerless.68 They exist at the complete whim of the state, and
they are thus a creature of and an agent of the state.69 That said, a number of
commentators and courts have found there to be an independent value of
“localism.”70 This view is often tied to Toqueville’s observations in Democracy
in America.71 He believed that in order to be effective, local governments must
have both independence and power.72 Although he recognized that this might
result in a more inefficient system of government, he believed in the value of
this type of strong local government.73 Toqueville felt that this sort of model
would encourage political participation, through which people could learn to be
democratic citizens; and it would prevent despotism by uniting otherwise
individualistic Americans.74
In addition to this theoretical value in localism, or perhaps in part because
of it, some states began granting “home rule” power to some of their
municipalities.75 There are a few ways that this can manifest, but generally it
67 This Article examines a system that involves the interplay between two tiers of
delegation: federal-state and state-local. Although this is not a topic that has been heavily
written about in the legal literature, this Article builds upon some foundational work
addressing federalism and localism. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 66, at 1201 (“[E]xplor[ing]
one aspect of this intrastate competition—the extent to which federal law can delegate
federal powers to specific state or local institutions even against the will of the state
legislature.”); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 964–79 (2007) (addressing direct relations
between federal and local governments); see also Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism,
U.C. HASTINGS RES. PAPER NO. 258 (manuscript at 10–14) (on file with author)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071907 [https://perma.cc/BE57-B6AM] (addressing state-local
delegations); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 21–33 (2010) (discussing federalism in the context not just of states, but cities and
special purpose institutions); Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994)
(noting that values of federalism may be better served by localities rather than states).
68 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907).
69 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1, 8 (7th ed. 2008).
70 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 67, at 961 (addressing direct relations between federal
and local governments).
71 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61 (Lynn Hunt et al. eds.,
Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings trans., Bedford/St. Martins 2009) (1835).
72 Id. at 57.
73 Id. at 57.
74 Id. at 57–58.
75 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (“The home rule movement had two goals: to undo Dillon’s
Rule by giving localities broad lawmaking authority and to provide local governments
freedom from state interference in areas of local concern.”).
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means that the local government has the power to regulate purely local areas of
law.76 These are areas that do not need to be handled uniformly and that will not
result in significant external effects on other communities.77 In some
jurisdictions, if a local ordinance governs a purely local issue, the local
government’s rule can trump a state rule on the same topic.78 In other home rule
jurisdictions, the locality can only act if the state has not.79 If the state decides
to speak on an issue, and the state and local rules are in conflict, the state will
win.80 This is especially true if the local ordinance is less restrictive than the
state standards.81 Of course, there are often questions about whether something
is a purely local issue, or if there are local and state rules on similar topics,
whether they are in conflict or can co-exist.
As Stephen Miller noted, “[t]he food sovereignty movement is clearly
structured to pit established principles of federalism and supremacy against
local government’s home rule powers.”82 Indeed, it is only if the local
government’s home rule powers control that a locality could declare itself
exempt from state food regulations,83 which is a goal of many food sovereignty
activists.84 However, the actions of local governments are often limited; as
Professor Paul Diller recently noted, “the frequent preemption of city authority
by Congress and especially state legislatures prohibits local governments from
layering or reducing additional regulation when they see fit.”85 This is the
classic problem that local government scholars and lawyers struggle with when
trying to support local action.
Recently, there have been many examples of state legislatures seeking to
remove power from local governments by taking preventative action to prohibit
localities from enacting certain regulations.86 These state actions sometimes
manifest as express attempts to limit or remove home rule powers from
localities.87 For example, the Texas legislature enacted a law that would prevent

76 Id. at 10–11.
77 Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage

Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1049–50 (2017).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1048.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Miller, supra note 37, at 434.
83 Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 309–10.
84 See Rich Hewitt, Farmers Seek to Protect Locally Grown Foods, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/02/24/news/hancock/farmersseek-to-protect-locally-grown-foods [https://perma.cc/UX46-RWGY]. But see Condra,
Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 299 (“Food sovereignty envisions a continued and
central role of government in pursuit of its goals.”).
85 Diller, supra note 77, at 1048.
86 See Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local
Policy Innovation, 47 J. FEDERALISM 403, 404 (2017).
87 Id. at 405.
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its municipalities from banning fracking,88 and more recently other states have
proposed the imposition of fines on local legislators, or their removal from
office, if they attempt to adopt ordinances that govern certain subjects.89 This
trend toward removing power from municipalities would not bode well for food
sovereignty ordinances.90 However, at least one state has been actively working
in opposition to this trend in the food sovereignty area. The following Part
discusses that example.

VI. THE STATE OF MAINE AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY
Maine has been described as a state whose local food systems and values
are “deeply embedded in long-standing social and political norms.”91 Perhaps
this is part of the reason that the state presents a unique and compelling recent
example of a state’s response to local food sovereignty ordinances.
In June 2011, the Maine state legislature passed a resolution stating, “the
basis of human sustenance rests on the ability of all people to save seed and
grow, process, consume and exchange food and farm products.”92 The
resolution provided that the state would “oppose any federal statute, law or
regulation that attempts to threaten our basic human right to save seed and grow,
process, consume and exchange food and farm products within the State of
Maine.”93 This was, in part, a response to concerns of Maine farmers who
wanted to slaughter and process poultry in the open air on their farms, and who
wanted to sell raw milk.94

88 See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West 2015) (“The authority of a

municipality or other political subdivision to regulate an oil and gas operation is expressly
preempted.”).
89 Douglas Hanks & Elizabeth Koh, Florida Mayors Can Be Fined $5,000 if They Enact
Stricter Local Rules on Gun Control, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article200997094.html
[https://perma.cc/F2DH-HLWC]; see also Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make Their
Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-make-their-own-rules-red-states-wont-letthem.html [https://perma.cc/TF8R-BKXC].
90 It is important to note, however, that state preemption is perhaps more common when
local legislators are seeking to enact additional, or affirmative, regulation. Food sovereignty
ordinances could be viewed as a form of deregulation, and thus perhaps they are not as
threatening to some states. See, e.g., Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 303–04
(discussing the libertarian characteristics of local food sovereignty ordinances); Pollans,
supra note 60 (contrasting food sovereignty with food freedom).
91 Kurtz, supra note 34, at 170.
92 H.R.J. Res. 1176, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011).
93 Id.
94 Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 303–04 (describing motivations behind
Maine’s food sovereignty movement).
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These same concerns had also led a number of localities in the state to begin
adopting food sovereignty ordinances.95 These ordinances resemble one
another, and were often based off of a model ordinance. An example reads,
We, the People of the Town of Sedgwick, Hancock County, Maine, have the
right to produce, process, sell, purchase and consume local foods thus
promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family farms, and local food
traditions. We recognize that family farms, sustainable agricultural practices,
and food processing by individuals, families and non-corporate entities offers
stability to our rural way of life by enhancing the economic, environmental and
social wealth of our community. As such, our right to a local food system
requires us to assert our inherent right to self-government. We recognize the
authority to protect that right as belonging to the Town of Sedgwick. 96

When towns began adopting these food sovereignty ordinances, it was hard
not to assume, from a legal perspective, that they would have no effect. Knowing
what we know about federalism and preemption, legal scholars assumed that
there was no merit in or point to these ordinances.97 The ordinances could, of
course, serve a powerful narrative function, with towns asserting their interest
in self-governance,98 but from a practical perspective, it seemed like a matter of
time before the state or federal government would step in to put an end to the
ordinances and any actions that resulted from them. Despite this legal
perspective, many farmers took these local declarations of food sovereignty
seriously, and began taking sovereign actions in response to them.99
Acting as if the food sovereignty ordinances were controlling led to at least
one lawsuit. A Maine raw milk producer—Farmer Dan Brown—wound up in
court.100 The state of Maine (along with about twenty-four other states)101
allows the sale of raw milk within the state, but it requires the farmers producing
the milk to comply with state licensing and inspection procedures.102 Some
95 Hewitt, supra note 84.
96 Sedgwick, Me., Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (Mar. 5,

2011).

97 Briffault, supra note 67, at 1335–44; See Ryan Almy, State v. Brown: A Test for
Local Food Ordinances, 65:2 ME. L. REV. 790, 795 (2013).
98 Even if ordinances are preempted, they may serve other functions, including showing
an expression of dissent or dissatisfaction with the status quo. Austin Raynor, The New State
Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613, 635 (2015) (“Even many preempted statutes,
however—such as those that declare federal law void—remain capable of fulfilling a similar
expressive function.”). They can also function as catalysts for lawsuits. Id. at 638.
99 See, e.g., Kevin Miller, State Sues Blue Hill Farmer for Selling Unpasteurized Milk
at Farmers’ Markets, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), https://bangordailynews.com
/2011/11/16/news/hancock/blue-hill-farmer-cited-for-violating-state-law/ [https://perma.cc
/6P28-FGDD].
100 Id.
101 CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SALE OF RAW MILK AND OUTBREAKS
LINKED TO RAW MILK, BY STATE (2015).
102 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, ch. 8-F §§ 2902-A–2902-B (2000).
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farmers, including Farmer Brown, viewed the local food sovereignty ordinances
in their towns as sufficient to exempt them from those state requirements.103
Brown’s case went to court.
As was aforementioned, many commentators and lawyers assumed that the
court would find that the state licensing and inspection laws preempted the local
food sovereignty ordinance.104 Indeed, that was the holding at the Superior
Court level.105 However, on appeal, in 2014, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court
used statutory construction to avoid the question and decided the farmer’s case
on other grounds.106 Thus, the question about whether existing state law
preempted these local ordinances remained.
As was addressed briefly above, many localities feel constrained by the
threat of state or federal overrule,107 and thus do not act as boldly as they
otherwise might. In Maine, however, the localities did not let this concern stop
them from passing their food sovereignty ordinances. And interestingly, instead
of taking action to block those localities, the state Legislature decided to take
action in an attempt to further the goals of these towns.
In late 2017, the Maine State Legislature decided that it wanted to take
action to affirmatively support these food-sovereign towns, and farmers like
Farmer Brown. Although in prior years, bills along these lines had been
proposed, they never became law.108 This year was different. The state
legislature adopted a law—An Act To Recognize Local Control Regarding Food
Systems—acknowledging that municipalities may, pursuant to their home rule
powers, adopt food sovereignty ordinances, and that the state would recognize
and observe these ordinances.109 In doing so, the state adopted findings that
local control of food systems would help ensure the preservation of small family
farms, improve food security, promote self-reliance, enhance rural economic
development, and enhance the environmental wealth of rural communities.110
This seems like a useful way that states can ensure their localities have the
authority and power to act in furtherance of environmental goals, such as
supporting local food systems. As I mentioned above, without such express
authorization, even cities with home rule power are sometimes barred from
103 Miller, supra note 99.
104 See Almy, supra note 97, at 805.
105 State v. Brown, 95 A.3d 82, 91–92 (Me. 2014).
106 Id. at 91 (holding that the municipal ordinance would be construed to avoid a

preemption issue and that civil penalties could be imposed on the farmer for each act that
constituted a violation of state licensing and labeling laws).
107 Diller, supra note 77, at 1049 (“With the threat of state legislative, congressional,
and presidential override . . . local governments are highly constrained in how they can
implement their residents’ preferred policies.”).
108 See e.g., Kent Miller, Maine Senate Rejects Proposed ‘Right to Food’
Constitutional Amendment, PRESS HERALD (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.pressherald.com/
2016/03/23/maine-senate-votes-down-proposed-right-to-food-constitutional-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/HAZ3-HLKE].
109 Maine Food Sovereignty Act, ME. STAT. tit. 7, ch. 8-F § 283 (2017).
110 Id.
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acting in areas that are already heavily regulated. However, if the state gives
express authorization to a locality to regulate in a certain area, as the state of
Maine did here, that lessens concerns about preemption or about the locality
acting beyond the scope of its home rule authority.
Despite the novelty of the state’s action here, there are a few concerns that
must be addressed. First, there is still a pressing normative question about food
safety, and whether it makes sense for localities to exempt themselves from state
regulations. Further, perhaps the biggest problem is this: the state is not the final
arbiter in the area of food safety and regulation. As was discussed earlier, there
is a massive federal regulatory system, overseen by the USDA and FDA, with
respect to food production.
This soon became apparent. A few weeks before the new law was set to take
effect, the Governor of Maine received a letter from the USDA threatening to
transfer control of meat and poultry from the state to federal inspectors, in light
of the new state law.111 The USDA did not believe that the state could ensure
that state and local requirements would be at least as strict as the federal rules
given that the state was basically agreeing to turn over control of food
inspections and regulation to localities in some circumstances.112 Although it is
quite possible that the federal government would have lacked the capacity to
follow through on its threat, the Governor and Legislature did not seem willing
to take that risk.113 Thus, the state legislature called an emergency session and
amended its new law,114 substantially weakening it by expressly stating that the
state would: (a) continue to require state inspection and licensing (pursuant to
federal law) for meat and poultry (which obviously means removing a lot of
local discretion from the food sovereign towns);115 and (b) limit local control
111 Letter from Almanza, supra note 45; see also Food Sovereignty in Maine: Maine’s

2017 Food Sovereignty Law Does Not Impact Farmers’ Markets, ME. FED’N FARMERS’
MKTS., http://www.mainefarmersmarkets.org/food-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/5VTK9A94] (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Mary Pols, Food Law Leaves Maine Meat Producers
Squealing for a Fix, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pressherald.
com/2017/10/18/maines-meat-and-poultry-producers-caught-in-the-middle-of-foodsovereignty-fight/ [https://perma.cc/3BVW-Z4R6].
112 Letter from Almanza, supra note 45.
113 There is a real possibility that some states might seek to achieve a goal through underenforcement, assuming a lack of capacity to enforce federal law. See Eric Yoder,
Understaffing, Lack of Training at Agencies Hampering Agency Services to Public,
Personnel Agency Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2018/02/08/understaffing-lack-of-training-at-agencies-hamperingagency-services-to-public-personnel-agency-says/?utm_term=.8834cdf38558
[https://perma.cc/YB65-QCS7].
114 S.J. Res. 605, 128th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2017).
115 Maine Food Sovereignty Act, ME. STAT. tit. 7, ch. 8-F § 285 (2017)
(“Notwithstanding any provision in this chapter to the contrary, the department shall
implement and enforce all provisions of Title 22, chapter 562-A and the rules adopted
thereunder that are necessary to ensure that the requirements of the State’s meat and poultry
products inspection and licensing program are at least equal to the applicable requirements
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over other products to situations that involve face to face interactions at the site
where the food was produced (thus, the law does not cover transactions at, for
example, farmer’s markets).116

VII. CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that there is work for states to do here, to enable and aid
their localities in taking forward-looking steps toward improving the
environment; however, they must be sure to remember that they are still subject
to a number of federal provisions. It is somewhat surprising that the State of
Maine failed to consider these issues before adopting its state statute. That said,
there are certain areas where states have substantial control—in the food
context, for example, states have more control over eggs and dairy than they do
over meat and poultry.117 Thus, in these areas of state control, states have more
flexibility to expressly defer to local decision-making. Doing so removes
questions about whether home rule power alone is strong enough to empower
local governments, and gives local governments more confidence in their ability
to take bold actions toward protecting the environment.
Further, to the extent more states join with Maine in passing laws such as
these, it could serve a democratic function, signaling to the federal government
that this is what its citizens want.118 This could, perhaps, result in certain federal
carve-outs, or a rethinking of the scale of regulation that is necessary and
appropriate in the context of food safety and food systems.
For now, in food sovereign towns in Maine, a consumer can purchase
directly from a farmer products like milk, cheese, pickles, and other canned
foods that have not undergone any state inspection or licensing. This is all done
with the state’s explicit approval. Even a fix as small as this should enable more

specified under applicable federal acts, as defined by the United States Department of
Agriculture or other federal agencies, without exception.”).
116 Id. at § 282(1) (defining “direct producer-to-consumer transactions” as that phrase is
used in the law); id. at § 286 (“An individual who grows, produces, processes or prepares
food or food products for purposes other than direct producer-to-consumer transactions in a
municipality that adopts or amends an ordinance pursuant to [this new law] shall grow,
produce, process or prepare the food or food products in compliance with all applicable state
and federal food safety laws, rules and regulations.”); see also id. at § 283.
117 Note that farmers with fewer than 1,000 chickens have reduced federal compliance
requirements. See LYNN BLIVEN ET AL., NEW YORK STATE ON-FARM POULTRY SLAUGHTER
GUIDELINES: FOOD SAFETY AND BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR FARMERS PROCESSING
LESS THAN 1000 BIRDS/YEAR (2012), http://smallfarms.cornell.edu/resources/guides/onfarm-poultry-slaughter-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/LV9B-W8S9].
118 Wyoming passed a similar Food Freedom Act. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-49-101 to 103 (2018). Colorado has also adopted a law. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1614 (2016).
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small farmers, who could not afford to comply with state oversight and
regulations, to produce and distribute local foods to their neighbors.119

119 Further, if someone gets sick, perhaps the existence of strict liability tort, combined
with the ease of being able to trace the source of the illness, will negate the need for grander
and more comprehensive food safety regulations.

